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IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS CHEEK, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
CLAY BULLOCH CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; and CLAY 
BULLOCH, an Individual, 
Defendants/A pellees. 
REPLY BREIF OF APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No: 20150177-CA 
Ci~INo.030500447 
Judge:PaulD.Lyman 
I 
JURISDICTION 
Appellees agree with the Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78A-4-l 03(2) (j) ( 1953, as 
amended). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
on or about the 13 th day of March, 2015, pursuant Rule 42(a), Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure and neither party has objected to such transfer. 
II 
RESOLUTION OF STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellees do not appear to take issue with the Statement of Facts set forth in 
Appellant's brief, the Appellant making specific reference to that which was stated at trial 
and introduced as exhibits therein compared to Appellees' general characterization of 
statements made within the transcript to support its contention that there was no formal 
construction contract or that the supporting documentation, such as plans and instruction 
details, were not sufficient to build such a structure and that this in some way justified the 
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Appellees, a Utah State licensed building contractor, who secured a building pennit, to 
not have to build the same according to the Unifonn Building Code. They put forth the 
assertion that this in some way excused their responsibility to build the structure on the 
property owned by the Appellant or to build it in compliance with the permit 
requirements or the Unifonn Building Code. They suggest that Appellant was a party to 
and participated in agreeing to build a p01iion of the structure, the concrete slabs for the 
air conditioning units, upon property owned by another and that this in some way 
excused them from their responsibility as a general contractor not to allow it. They 
suggest that the damage, the foundation failure of the building, was not the result of 
failing to over excavate before placing the footings as required by the geotechnical soils 
report prepared for the project but was the result of over saturation of soils due to a water 
line leak which they discovered during construction but finished the project anyway. 
However, due to that, they claim no responsibility for the failure of the building thereafter 
having completed construction thereof notwithstanding the saturation issue and having 
issued a certificate of completion relied upon by others to issue an occupancy permit and 
to allow for financing. The Appellant maintains that this does not excuse performance on 
the part of the Appellees for breach of contract and damages. 
III 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEES' ARGUMENTS 
The Appellees assert that Appellant's claims on appeal should not prevail because 
the issues were not preserved at trial; the court's rulings were appropriate and Appellant 
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fails to marshal the evidence. However, Appellant asserts that Appellees have 
mischaracterized the facts and circumstances and that the appeal is proper and 
appropriately set forth. The Appellant submits the following points and authorities in 
response to Appellees' argument as follows: 
POINT No.1 
APPELLEES CLAIM THAT CHEEK FAILED TO PERSERVE THE ISSUE OF 
FOR RECUSAL UNDER RULE 63(b). 
HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT A FAIR CHARACTERIZATION OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND IGNORES THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN BY BY 
THE PARTIES AND BY JUDGE LYMAN IN ADDRESSING THE ISSUES FOR 
PRESERVATION PURPOSES. 
The Appellees argue that the issue of recusal is not an issue preserved on appeal, 
notwithstanding the fact that although not characterized as a Rule 63(b) motion to recuse, 
the issue was addressed and reconsidered in the context of the circumstances that existed. 
This involved the voluntary recusal of the Honorable Judge J. Phillip Eves referring the 
matter to a "judge outside of the fifth district". See the record at 386, addendum, Exhibit 
~'A'' at 43 of Appellant's initial brief. There was also a motion filed for reconsideration 
which indicated that the court analyzed the matter under Rule 63(b) even though the 
record revealed that there was no such motion brought before Judge Eves who had 
recused himself sua sponte voluntarily. The pleadings filed for reconsideration 
considered the matter in the context of restraint and self-policing required by the Informal 
Ethics Advisory Opinion 98-14, in the record at 431, Exhibit "B" of the addendum to 
Appellant's initial brief. Judge Lyman's ruling, filed September 16, 2013, addressed 
specifically Rule 63(b ), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stating the following: 
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Rule 63, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, controls recusal matters. When a Rule 
63(b) motion to disqualify a judge is filed, the judge against whom the motion is filed has 
two options: first, enter an order granting the motion or, second, certify the motion and 
affidavit to a reviewing judge Rule 63(b) (2). If the motion is granted the disqualified 
judge shall direct the presiding judge or the court to assign another judge. No other orders 
are authorized by this Rule. 
In this matter, Judge J. Phillip Eves was asked to recuse himself. He granted the 
motion to disqualify himself, but added an unauthorized statement "the case will be 
referred to a judge outside of the fifth district." This directive was not allowed under the 
Rule and did not create an order. 
Judge Lyman added a footnote to his decision which states the following: 
If Judge Eves happen to be the fifth district presiding judge, than this directive 
may well have been authorized. However, the pleadings do not indicate whether he was 
the presiding judge. See the record 428-29, addendum, Exhibit -~A", Appellant's initial 
brief. 
Judge Lyman goes on to assert that he is assigned to handle district court matters 
in Beaver County, pursuant to Rule 3-108 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration and that 
this does not make judges under such assignments judges of the receiving district. Upon 
request for reconsideration the matter was addressed in the context of Informal Ethics 
Advisory Opinion 98-14 which by footnote states that the Administration of the Courts 
advises that the State Judiciary continues to rely upon this ethics opinion. It pointed out 
that the opinion is designed to address "appearances" as well as actual conflicts. See the 
record at 446-47. This advisory opinion makes clear that certain relationships, such as 
Clerks and Judges within the same district, require ·'automatic" self disqualification, are 
not subject to judicial discretion or requiring an affinnative motion. It does not 
distinguish between district judges or assigned district judges. The request fu11her states 
4 
that the reason for Appellant characterizing the motion accordingly was out of respect for 
the court and the dignity of the judicial process which trial counsel, K. L. Mciff, was 
sworn to uphold. See the record at 43 3. 
Appellees fail to take into consideration the fact that the district court judge, the 
Honorable Judge J. Phillip Eves, had previously recused himself voluntarily and by 
referring the matter to a judge outside of the fifth district gave reason enough to indicate 
that the matter involved a relationship that by appearance alone was too close to simply 
assign to another judge in the district. Appellees argue this based upon Rule 63 (b) but 
fails to take in consideration the cautionary approach required under the lnfonnal Ethics 
Advisory Opinion 98-14. More to the point, however, the matter was properly briefed and 
addressed at the trial court and has been preserved for appeal. Although the trial court 
judge treated the matter summarily, procedure, by his own analysis, required that the 
motion be certified and reviewed by another judge in light of the circumstances involving 
voluntary recusal and a referral of the matter outside the district. This was not done. 
Rather, Judge Lyman simply ruled that there was no such conflict because there was no 
close working relationship involving Appellees' spouse, co-owner and officer, Carolyn 
Bulloch, who is the Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court. There was also raised for 
consideration the issue in the context of Rule 2.11, Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, and 
this offers the more appropriate application which was addressed both in the pleadings 
and in argument by Appellant and Appellees. The Appellees take the position that this 
requires a showing of a close working relationship and the Appellant takes the position 
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consistent with that set forth in the comment section that states that a judge is disqualified 
when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the 
specific provisions of paragraphs 1-6 therein apply. It further notes that such 
disqualification is required regardless of whether or not a motion to disqualify is filed. 
Appellant takes the position that simply arguing that a Rule 63(b) motion for recusal was 
not directly filed is not a fair assessment of the circumstances and pleadings upon which 
a determination by the trial court was made and that this issue has been appropriately 
preserved for appeal purposes. The Appellant asserts that the trial court's decision fails to 
address the issue in proper context and attempts simply to limit the broader application of 
the policy to only apply to close working relationships even though the influence of the 
Clerk of the Court runs to much broader a circles and regions and requires 
disqualification whenever a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. This is a 
decision that the Court of Appeals should afford no deference but review for correctness 
and it is further compromised by the fact that the trial comi judge in this case did not 
follow the established procedure for review of such issue of recusal. It is a decision that 
would have a far more reaching impact when considered in light of the final ruling in the 
case. 
Ill 
Ill 
POINT No. 2 
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THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER ARE FUNDAMENTALLY FLA WED AND DO NOT ACCOUNT 
FOR EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
Appellees make the same mistake as the trial court in attempting to dodge the 
issue of integration and yet assume that there were sufficient tenns to find an enforceable 
contract between the parties. The action of Appellees in constructing the building was 
consistent with one who believed that the terms were sufficiently detailed to commence 
and complete the project. This understanding has been assumed throughout the 
proceedings as well. It is upon this understanding that the parties performed 
notwithstanding the fact that the documentation involved in the transaction may have 
been mdimentary. The issue of integration comes to light because the trial court through 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order determined the scope and 
definition of the contract between the parties without considering appropriately the 
documentation relied upon in building the structure or adding to it years later. In essence, 
the trial court attempted to interpret t~e contract, defining its terms and scope solely upon 
the testimony of the parties, ignoring or marginalizing the essential documentation 
~ prepared and generated for the project itself such as the building plans, structural notes 
and footing construction detail as well as failing to account for the geotechnical soils 
report that required over excavation and recompaction is a specified manner. Taking 
issue with whether or not the agreement was integrated because there was no 
comprehensive written document misses the point entirely. This is not an issue of fonn as 
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much as it is one of scope and perfonnance determined by how the parties conducted 
themselves during construction. Appellees note that this court has ruled that an agreement 
is integrated when the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings (in whatever form they 
may take) as a final and complete expression of their agreement. See Bennett v Huish, 
2007 Utah App 19, if 15, 155 P. 3d 917; see also City of Grantsville v Redevelopment 
Agency of Tooele City, 2010, UT 38, ~ 24,233 P. 3d. However, as has been previously 
cited, an integrated agreement is one where its understanding often includes perfonnance 
beyond that which is expressed but defined by the conduct of the parties. That is the case 
here. The course of performance suggests in this case that the contract tenns written 
down together with site plans and structural notations as well as foundation detail were 
together sufficient to find an integrated agreement. This is undisputed and reflected in the 
way that the parties conducted themselves addressing the issues of breach and 
perfonnance rather than whether or not there was a contract. However, Appellees seem to 
take the position that the lack of detail in some terms such as electrical installation 
offered a defense for them to ignore the detail provided in foundation and footing 
preparation. They present this as a defense to justify them building the building so that it 
encroached upon the property of another. This is not a case about electrical installation. It 
is a case about the general contractor of the project not building the building to meet the 
requirements of the Unifonn Building Code, failing to follow the over excavation and 
recompaction requirements of the geotechnical soils report and failing to build the 
structure on Appellant's property without trespassing upon the property of another. The 
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C, 
\IV 
Appellant contends that it is fundamental to any construction contract, whether expressed 
or simply understood by inference, that building construction will confonn with the 
Unifonn Building Code and that an owner has a reasonable expectation that the building 
will be built upon his property and not encroach upon the property of another. It is not a 
defense for the Appellees to claim that the contract lacks sufficient detail to be an 
integrated agreement. In fact, the trial court made findings accordingly. In paragraph 5 of 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, see the record at 559-71, Exhibit 
"G" of the addendum, Appellant's initial brief, as a part of its findings of fact, the trial 
court states that there were two agreements to construct a building between the parties, 
i.e., the original Sears building and the Sears building addition. The court also finds that 
the Appellant acquired a survey and a site plan from Bulloch Brothers Engineering. 
Noting that there is not relationship between the Appellees, Clay Bulloch and Bulloch 
Brother Engineering, Inc. the comi notes further that the agreement was partially 
evidenced by documents and pa1iially oral. It notes that Bulloch Brothers Engineering did 
a survey on the original site and they also prepared the survey and site plan for the 
Appellant. However, Judge Lyman then makes a finding inconsistent with the evidence 
presented at trial. The site plan shows that the comers of the property were staked and not 
the comers of the building. Moreover, the Appellees' testimony defies common sense. A 
surveyor would not stake the building. He would stake the comers of the property that he 
surveyed. The engineer preparing the site plans would not be out placing stakes on the 
property, especially when they would need to be removed in order to meet the conditions 
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of over excavation. The soils report required over excavation of five feet and this very 
point was addressed by Appellant's counsel on cross examination of Appellee which 
went as follows: 
Q. There is no indication that I can see on Exhibit No. 3 of the other two--or the other--
the comers of the building being located. Can you see anything on that Exhibit that would 
reveal that? 
Q. By Mr. Mciff: Alright. My question was, are you aware of any other survey that 
resulted in the marking of the other corner of the building other than the Bulloch Brothers 
survey? Are you aware of any other survey? 
A. When a survey comes out and surveys it, they do not produce a drawing that 
shows four points. You already got the plot plan here. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I do not know the question you are asking me. 
Q. Well I--
A. I do not understand the question you are asking. 
Q. I am trying to find out if you are aware of any survey that would have resulted in 
stake on the corner other than the southeast corner? 
A. There was four stakes in the area when I put the building on it. 
Q. Oh alright. How many of those-- how many of those stakes would have been 
removed in your over excavation? 
A. Well, you have to remove the stakes if you are going to over excavate, see the 
record at 635, pages 164-66, volume 3, attached as Exhibit "I'~ of the addendum, 
Appellant's initial brief (Emphasis added) 
However, this position shifted when Appellees responded as follows: 
Q. Look at Exhibit No. 5. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Site plan. You got that before you, Exhibit No. 5? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. You see the line that is at the property line on the east as well as the outside edge of 
the building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The same is true of the south part of the way. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
10 
Q 
Q. When you over excavate five feet beyond the property line on the east and the 
south how would you have maintained those stakes on the property corners? 
A. You cannot go five feet to the south. I am on someone else's property. That-- I do 
not understand what you are asking me. 
Q. I am trying to understand how you over excavate five feet on the east and five 
feet on the south without wiping out those stakes. 
A. The property stakes have to stay where there are at. I cannot be on someone 
else's property. 
Q. So are saying that you did not go five feet outside of the building? 
A. You cannot it is impossible. 
A. I dug it right on the property line, the thickness of the baco. 
Q. And that is it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. did you put the building-- or did you attempt to put the building right on the 
property line? 
A. No. 
Q. What did you attempt to do? 
A. We went in the two feet 1-- it was already prestaked. The reference point for the 
corners was there. 
See the record at 63 5 Trial Transcript, Volume Three, pages 166-67, attached as Exhibit 
'T' of the addendum of Appellants initial brief. (Emphasis added) 
In other words, the facts bare out that had Appellees over excavated as required by 
the geotechnical soils report and placed the footings accordingly, they would not have 
built the structure to encroach upon the property of another and the issue regarding 
redirecting the drainage pipe would not have involved encroaching upon the other 
adjoining property owner. More importantly, this is an issue that clearly shows that Judge 
Lyman erred in attempting to craft his findings based solely on the testimony of the 
parties without appropriately considering the documentation that was part of the 
integrated agreement which included the survey, site plan and soil's report. The findings 
reached by Judge Lyman in paragraphs 13-17 which found that there was an agreement 
11 
between the parties to encroach as to the placement of the air conditioning units, 
notwithstanding Appellant's denial of such agreement directly conflicts with the Supreme 
Court's long established position that a contract be interpreted in a way that gives 
reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all of its terms rather than adopt an 
interpretation that leaves part unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect. See Peirce v Peirce, 
2000 UT 7, ~ 27; see also Restatements 2d of Contracts, Section 203 (1981). More 
importantly, however, Appellees are the general contractor on the project and have a duty 
and responsibility to conform construction to meet both the building permit and the 
Unifonn Building Code. They are not relieved of that responsibility by attempting to gain 
approval of the owner to encroach upon the interests of another property owner. It is not 
an appropriate basis for Judge Lyman to conclude as he did the following: 
18. Given the facts that are cited above this court finds that the Plaintiff has failed 
to meet his burden of proving the Defendants breached their agreement on either the 
constructed location of the building or the placement of the trespassing air conditioner. 
See the record at 561, see also Exhibit HG" of the addendum of Appellant's initial brief. 
POINT No. 3 
THE APPELLEES ERROR IN THEIR POSITION REGARDING MARSHALING 
OF THE EVIDENCE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Appellees consider Appellant's arguments to be those of sufficiency of evidence 
and to that extent claim that the Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence. Appellant 
points out that this was a five day bench trial and that had nearly one hundred exhibits 
and more than a dozen witnesses, construction plans and geotechnical soils reports, 
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surveys and photographs. This was to point out that it would be an overwhelming feat for 
any judge to articulate finding concerning each and every piece of evidence submitted at 
trial, but states that it was not overwhelming and would have been appropriate to address 
the Findings and Conclusions of Law and Order purposed by the Appellanfs trial counsel 
which had been made a part of the record, particularly when the same was done as trial 
counsel's only option in lieu of closing argument. The proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were made a part of Appellant's initial brief, Exhibit "F", to show 
that they were made a part of the record and made available to Judge Lyman at the time 
he prepared his own Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. A comparison shows that 
Judge Lyman disregarded Appellant's proposed findings. Appellant's proposed findings 
track the evidence, Judge Lyman's do not. That does not make this a sufficiency of the 
evidence case. Rather, Appellant contends that the issue is one of contract interpretation 
that requires more than weighing the credibility of the parties as witnesses and that the 
trial court erred in failing to make specific findings on undisputed evidence pertaining to 
the contract formation and performance and erred in not adopting the provisions 
addressed in Appellant's purposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This is a 
simple issue of whether the court's action was appropriate more than an issue of 
determining sufficiency of the evidence. Notwithstanding, Appellees draw attention to 
one point that bears further consideration; that is, Appellees state that with respect to the 
certificate of completion issued by Appellees, Cheek omitted crucial facts regarding the 
purpose of the certificate. They state the Cheek requested the documents in connection 
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with Cheek's request for financing from the U.S. Small Business Administration at the 
request of Cheek's lawyer. That document indicates that construction was completed in 
accordance with the "final plans" but, as it is discussed above, the parties had no "final 
plans" for the building or addition. The Appellant agrees that this is a crucial fact but not 
for the reason inferred in Appellee's brief. See Appellee's brief at pages 28-29. What is 
relevant is that Appellees issued the certificate of completion and in doing so 
affirmatively asserted that construction was completed in accordance with the "final 
plans". This was a document relied upon by third parties for financing and occupancy. It 
was also an indication to the owner and all those that relied upon the same that 
construction had been completed in accordance with the plans that complied with the 
Uniform Building Code upon which Appellees represented that it had been. Yet no 
mention of the certificate of completion is made in Judge Lyman's findings when he 
concluded as a matter of law that Appellant failed to meet his burden on the issues of 
trespass, drainage, over excavation, compaction and damages caused by settlement. 
Appellees are right in assuming from that oversight that there are additional details, facts 
and circumstances of this case that point to breach of contract and damages that were not 
considered by the court in issuing its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order. 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
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CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, counsel for Appellant prays 
that this Court reverse and remand as it deems appropriate, together with such other and 
further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper. 
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2016. 
15 
Isl J. Bryan Jackson 
J. BRYAN JACKSON 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
I certify that in compliance with Rule 24(f)( I), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
this reply brief contains 4,175 words, excluding the table of contents, table of authorities, 
and addenda. I further certify that in compliance with Rule 27(b ), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this reply brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced 
typeface using Microsoft Word 2007 in Times New Roman 13 point. 
16 
Isl J. Bryan Jackson 
J. BRYAN JACKSON 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 21 st day of January, 2016, I mailed a true and complete 
photocopy of the forgoing, CHEEKS' REPLY BRIEF, by way of the U.S. mail postage 
fully paid to: 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
V. LOWRY SNOW 
JONATHAN P. WENTZ 
Snow Jensen & Reece 
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B 
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84 770 
/s/ Shani Plexico 
Shoni Plexico, Legal Assistant 
17 
